JUNE, 1947

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Book Reviews

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

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● *'Fabian Quarterly,' like all other publications of the Fabian Society, represents not the collective view of the Society, but only the views of the people who contribute to it. The responsibility of the Fabian Society is limited to approving them as worthy of consideration within the Labour Movement.*

NOTE.

In this issue we are beginning a new feature, which we hope will be of use to all local groups and societies. Articles which lend themselves to talk or enquiry are followed by a short list of questions for discussion and suggestions for research. Any local society wishing to obtain further help in order to carry out research of any type, should get in touch with the Secretary of the Fabian Society's Local Societies Committee.

Through this committee, local societies can obtain help in making contacts, in devising schemes of research, in working out methods of enquiry, in the discovery of sources of information and in many other ways. A research sub-committee has been set up under the Local Societies Committee to deal with such matters and to arrange consultations on specific problems, produce schemes and questionnaires, lists of books and pamphlets for background reading, advice on the organising of research teams, and many other services of a similar type.

Help is also given in determining methods of publication of the results of research, commenting upon its value, and making use of its conclusions.

All correspondence in the first instance should be addressed to the Secretary of the Local Societies Committee.

● INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS—

Some lessons for Socialised Industry

by PATRICIA ELTON MAYO

Strikes in State-run industries, and unofficial strikes against the wishes of Trade Union Executives, indicate a state of affairs which it would be dangerous to ignore. Yet it is perhaps only now that the administrative implications of the 1945 Labour victory are becoming apparent. The unexpectedly large Socialist majority was taken by the leaders of the Labour Party to mean that the theoretical dogma of half a century could at last be translated into actual practice. But theoretical dogma has an unpleasant habit of becoming out of date. Politics are dynamic, and there are matters today which are just as important as Socialism, and which, if left unrecognised, could make a travesty of Socialism itself.

The original object of the Socialists' industrial programme was to secure that the administration of the country's basic industries should be for the benefit of the community rather than the private shareholder. A further aim was that the factories of the nineteenth century—dismal and autocratic places—should be reorganised on democratic lines.

It is this latter point which must be stressed today, now that the former has become an actuality. The industrial worker wants more than a change of boss. Indeed, if the taking over of industry by the State is not accompanied by certain administrative safeguards for the worker, State ownership could impose an even heavier tyranny than the private owner has sometimes done. In fact recent strikes may be an indication that more future trouble lies in the actual methods of running industry, than in its ownership.

Strikes are a protest against ineffective administration, when other methods of protest have either failed or do not exist. It can be the administration of management which is to blame, or it can be administrative defects in the Trade Union handling the men's complaints. Stoppages in the coal industry since it was nationalised are fewer than they were, but they still happen too often. Strikes are common occurrence against public corporations, and the unofficial strike is all too familiar. It is increasingly clear that it is managerial method which matters, both inside Trade Unions and inside industry, and that this matters quite as much if not more than change of ownership. It would be impossible to alter the managerial methods of certain industries without the direct intrusion of the State. The danger exists, however, that the first step can be mistaken for the end. The final objective is still a revolution in the way the working man is treated by his " boss ".

SMALLER FIRMS—FEWER STRIKES

If one makes an analysis of those industries which have succeeded to all intents and purposes in eliminating the strike, certain rather startling

facts emerge. Strikes decrease in number the nearer the industrial worker is organisationally to the administrative control of his factory or union. Large organisations have therefore a greater liability to strikes than smaller ones. The difficulties which beset State ownership are for the most part the same difficulties inherent in all large forms of organisation; and many of the administrative difficulties of the bigger Trade Unions come under the same heading. There are, however, examples of huge organisations which have long since ceased to suffer from the strike, as well as a number of progressive firms of smaller size. On analysis these firms have all introduced certain new sections of management, but not just on paper. If one says, which is true, that all these firms have developed Personnel management, this is clearly only half the story because there are also examples of firms with Personnel Managers where relations are bad. The problem of humanising industrial work is bigger than the simple creation of an additional branch of management.

ELIMINATION OF LABOUR TROUBLE—THREE FACTORS

The creation of an impartial judicial system for the enforcement of factory discipline has been one of the most important factors in the elimination of labour trouble. The foreman as party to a dispute, no longer has the right to settle it. A second factor has been the speedy investigation of complaints and grievances when and where they arise. The time lag in dealing with complaints is one of the most potent causes of ill feeling, and one most likely to occur in a large organisation, not so much because it is large but rather because of the tendency to over-centralisation. If State operated industry is to avoid bad feeling it will have to evolve methods of dealing with grievances locally, and, where possible, finally. In disputes settled away from the factory the arbitrators seldom get a clear picture of all the causes of friction. This suggestion is meant in no way as a threat to the extra-factory arbitration machinery which has been built up carefully over the years, and which is very necessary as a court of appeal. There has been a tendency, however, in some organisations the moment a dispute occurs to refer the matter to external arbitration. Provided the workers side is handled by the trade union representatives, organised labour should have nothing to fear from an increased number of disputes settled at factory level. There are a number of industries where this system already operates with the blessing of the trade unions, and only exceptional cases are referred to the local or national machinery.

The third factor to be found in those organisations which have succeeded in eliminating the strike has been the passing on of adequate information to the workers about future production plans, and their place in these plans. It is hardly surprising that men strike when they are suddenly informed without prior information or explanation that five hundred of them are redundant. Quite apart from stoppages of work, it is quite impossible for a worker to feel any enthusiasm about his job if he never knows from day to day whether he will be doing the same job tomorrow. This does not only include the dismissal of workers

for redundancy, but arbitrary and unexplained moves from one job to another in the same factory or location.

All these factors are of first class importance in State run industry. Just because workers are employed by the State does not mean that they are willing to forgo these conditions of employment.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

In those firms where the incidence of strikes and stoppages is low, management has in addition to the above measures, developed carefully the functions which usually come under the heading of Personnel Management. Clearly, however, it is the functions which matter more than the title of who performs them. In firms over a certain size it is always desirable to have a Personnel Department; but the measure of its success is the range of work it performs. There are very definite lessons for Socialist industry in this development, if happy relations are to be achieved. In the following paragraphs an analysis of these functions is made with comments as to the special difficulties in Government operated industry.

PAYMENT AND AGREEMENT OF WAGES

To an observer who has worked in other countries it is noticeable that in Britain wages are considered far more from a subsistence point of view than in the United States. In the latter country wages are used more as a positive stimulus to production. In England individual piece rates and other bonus systems have been evolved to stimulate output, but often by managements who were still wedded consciously or unconsciously to the idea that any increase in wages much over subsistence level was unnecessary, if not dangerous. This theory has been assisted in its growth by the negative policy of financial experts who have far too much say in the formation of wage policy. So whereas some industries have quite openly geared their wage policy to cost of living only, others have attempted to impose financial stimuli on this basis. There are remarkable exceptions to this state of affairs, and the effect on their output level is nearly always most marked. These exceptions are to be found in most industries, but particularly in the newer ones, such as rubber.

It is possibly between these two divergent principles that the Government should intervene. If it could impose standard minimum wages for all industries, based on a cost of living figure, and below which no employed man or woman would be allowed to fall, then it could be left to individual factories to evolve their own methods of payment over and above this. These would be based on their individual cost analyses, and they would be free to choose their own methods of financial incentive. Given that there are satisfactory relations between management and worker, and that the worker finds satisfaction in his work, financial incentives are still very important. This separation of principle should operate in State-run industry as well as private business. There is no reason why, within certain safeguards, state run factories should not work out their own financial incentives. Everyone concerned would then be able to understand the basis of payment, and variations based

on difference of cost should be a stimulus to economy of production method. If the Treasury mentality is permitted to interfere in Government run factories it will have a very depressing effect on production and enterprise.

In large organisations it is particularly important that the employee should understand the basis of his pay packet. In order to gain the co-operation of employees the shop-steward or shop representative should always be in on the pricing of a job. This is already common practice in a number of private and state run concerns, but it should certainly apply throughout socialist industry. Moreover, this co-operation alone is not enough. The shop-steward should be trained by his union to understand costing, and time and motion study. Negotiations for prices would then be on a much more factual basis than is often the case at present, and much of the workers' suspicion of both time and motion study would be removed. The fact that this is common practice among some of the newer industries in the United States has definitely contributed heavily to their high level of output.

As to whether piece rate, group bonus, or payment by the hour is best, Government factories could well carry out some impartial and accurate research on this subject. Failure of piece-rates to increase output is often due to bad relations between management and worker, and to suspicion as to the accuracy of the time study on which they are based, rather than to an inherent fault of piece rates themselves. Given that good relations could be established in socialised industry, and that methods of payment could be introduced in consultation with the workers, it might be possible to get some very much clearer ideas than we have at the moment as to what are the best systems of payment by result, if payment by result is desirable at all. Obviously the latter questions must vary enormously between industry and industry, and local spontaneity should be preserved here as well.

It is nearly always preferable that the actual negotiation of wages be at least supervised if not conducted by the Personnel Department. Production departments are all too apt to care for little else but the mechanics of production, and unpleasantness is all in the day's work. It is the responsibility of the Personnel Department to see that relations are as good as possible, and for this reason socialised industry should be careful that negotiations are conducted by the Personnel Department, where one exists.

EMPLOYMENT, SELECTION AND TRAINING

Initial employment happens only once in an organisation, but selection and training should be continuous processes, tying up with a sound promotion policy. This is particularly difficult to achieve in large organisations where the dangers of overlooking capable workers are considerable. It is necessary in factories over a certain size to be much more formal about promotion policy, and nowhere will this be truer than in State-run industry. In the old days a worker could hope to catch the eye of his boss, but a whole lifetime could be spent in some modern factories without this occurence. A good employment policy

must then balance two opposite principles. First, there must be an overall employment policy, both for an industry and for the factory. Such a policy must balance in a period of manpower shortage, the demands of different shops and factories in an organisation, at the same time keeping an eye on the promotional chances for different types of work. The opposing consideration is that impersonal employment is odious, and if employment is centrally handled in a large concern it will be impersonal, for the simple reason that the employment officer cannot know all the jobs personally, nor what the future worker's associates will be like.

The development which should be of interest to Socialist industry is that of the Personnel worker who works in the shops. This development has done much to balance the divergent demands of a sound employment policy. These workers carry out a number of personnel functions in the shops and, amongst them employment. Trained in modern methods of selection, they nevertheless work in the shops, know the foreman and the atmosphere of the working group. The new worker is therefore placed by someone who can work in conjunction with the foreman, but who can also balance the requirements of the shop with the overall requirements of the factory. This is achieved by arranging that employment only takes place on certain days of the week, in association with a centralised employment office. The latter is more in the nature of a statistics office, but the two combine forces in an employment conference, the central office indicating priorities. The candidates are then interviewed by the group labour officers either separately or together for borderline cases who might be suitable in a number of departments.

A worker is then able to start work under the eye of the official who employed him or her. The foreman is more likely to be pleasant as he will have been directly consulted by someone who knows the shop nearly as well as he does. Most important of all this ties up immediately with promotion policy. The group labour officers keep promotion files under subject headings. These files are kept centrally, but the group labour officer is responsible for supplying the information. This is based on a routine report on working efficiency by the foreman, and the result of a test by the Training Department; a note by the group labour officer on character suitability for promotion, and for what type of job, and in some cases a note by the shop steward. Departmental Heads agree to consult these files before filling a vacancy which entails promotion; below the level of charge hand this is the responsibility of the Departmental Head, but over and including the level of charge hand appointments are decided by a selection panel on which the personnel workers concerned and the production departments are represented. This is an example of a new development which is gaining ground, and which should certainly be considered in state run industry if it is to avoid the promotional stagnation of many overlarge organisations.

JOINT CONSULTATION

Too much has been said about joint consultation to discuss whether it is necessary or not. Any sensible administrator knows that it is both

necessary and useful, that it in no way interferes with the necessity for managerial leadership. If anything it increases this. What is not always realised in these days of centralised planning, however, is that joint consultation to work well must grow from the bottom of an organisation upwards, and nowhere is this truer than in state-run industry. Planning at national level it is all too easy to see lines of communication running downwards, imposed from the top.

But this is completely contrary to the spirit of joint consultation. Parliamentary proceedure on which it is based has always existed to connect the Government with the governed. To do this effectively such central or regional committees as may be necessary must have their roots in the factories, otherwise they will just be regarded as more central direction by the workers. Joint consultation should discourage the "we" "they" sentiment, and during the war it became evident that even inside large factories a central committee alone was not enough. To be successful these had to rest on shop committees consisting of the foreman, the shop stewards and a representative of the Personnel Department. These committees did not need to have formal meetings but they met automatically to deal with certain problems. This allowed the workers in the shops to see joint consultation taking place before their eyes, and the foreman, hitherto suspicious of the central body to which he probably did not belong, was also given a place in the joint consultative system. Foremen are represented on Joint Production Committees, but usually by only one foreman, as the whole idea of J P Cs was that higher management should have a chance to meet the workers direct representatives. Thus shop committees form a very necessary link in the appreciation of joint consultation by supervision, which no longer feels that it has been left out in the cold.

Having established these lines from the floor of the factory they should run right up to national level by a process of elimination. It is useless to imagine organisationally that at some unspecified point they can be merged with lines running from the centre outwards. Joint consultation in industry should provide the same service as the House of Commons in our national structure, namely a method of keeping top administrators informed about what those being "administered" feel; and no one has ever suggested the appointment of Members of Parliament by Whitehall.

WELFARE

The functions of safety and accident preventio , of providing good working surroundings, supervision of health, canteens and other such services as may be necessary, are closely bound up with the happiness and well being of the worker. But it is too often assumed that the mere provision of these alone will lead to good industrial relations. From the workers' point of view the quality of supervision, discipline and workshop atmosphere come first, and the welfare provisions second. Good working surroundings are very important, but there are factories where conditions are good and relations bad. It is important for the State to remember this because so often philanthropic employers have

ignored the more important questions, and it would be all too easy for the state to become paternalistic in its turn. Philanthropy is so often the easy way out for a big employer, but not for long. Socialist industry will obviously have to employ specialist personnel to handle these functions from an executive point of view. Workers' committees can be of the greatest value in fitting the welfare functions into democratically run industry. It could be possible to make these executives answerable to a joint committee, but it is not possible for a joint committee, consisting of people who have other jobs to do, to actually run a canteen or perform any other executive function. Nor is it desirable, as it is far more efficient to employ specialist personnel who understand the work. Nevertheless state run industry should make full use of joint committees from a supervisory point of view, and these committees should dovetail into the parent joint committee of the factory, preferably as sub-committees.

DISCIPLINE

So far as the industrial worker is concerned the questions which must be solved in state-run factories if they are to be a success, are firstly that his complaints and grievances should be dealt with promptly, and if possible locally; secondly that although he should be subject to industrial discipline this should be as judiciously impartial as possible; and thirdly that he should have certain inalienable rights of appeal accepted without question by management, first inside and then outside, the factory. It will be essential in socialised factories to see that there are responsible officials who can deal with and preferably settle grievances on the spot. Moreover, as regards the second point good governmental practice must be introduced internally into Socialist industry. The real contribution which Personnel Management has made to improved industrial relations has been in the introduction of the judicial and legislative functions. These have always existed in management, but have not been sufficiently recognised. As a result they have always been too closely fused with the technical side of industry, and have not been developed. There is the same need in a factory to separate the executive arm of management from the judicial as there is in the state, also to see that works rules (factory legislation) are agreed by the working force before they come into effect. In the old days if a worker fell foul of his foreman it was left to the foreman to decide whether he had broken the rules or not, and quite often to make up the rules on the spur of the moment. The penalty was often the sack.

Full employment has done much to discourage this state of affairs, but we must see to it that administrative safeguards are introduced into all industry, both socialised and private, so that such things cannot happen again. The advent of Socialised industry ought to mean that factories and trade unions will in future be run in a truly constitutional manner. Yet there is a danger that some of the bad methods of running industry will be carried over into State-operated concerns.

It is not always sufficiently realised that over-centralised administration is fundamentally anti-democratic, and that if the Labour Government is really to improve the lot of the working man, this is one of the things

which must be guarded against. Worker representation at headquarters is not enough. Methods of administration which are not bureaucratic are just as important, and are the answer amongst other things to a number of recent strikes.

Quite a lot is known about this field, and skilled guidance would be forthcoming from a number of quarters were it asked for. What is imperative is that the rank and file of the labour movement should realise the dangers inherent in the present situation. It would be deplorable if State-run industry were to ignore them. The legacy of carelessness in evolving good systems of administration is always the same: labour trouble and strikes. Strikes in Socialised industry will not be easy to tolerate, but repressive measures will be dangerously totalitarian. Moreover, it would be a very poor advertisement for a Labour Government if discipline in its own factories were worse than elsewhere. So far a small number of privately run concerns have led the field, and it is up to the Labour Government to take up the challenge.

● *FOR YOUR DISCUSSION GROUP*

Three factors in the elimination of labour trouble : impartial justice, speedy justice, spread of information. Are there any other factors? How important are they?

'Smaller firms—fewer strikes'. Does this hold good in your experience? What steps need to be taken to minimise the number of strikes in large firms? How far are these steps necessary in the case of smaller firms? How far are they applied in your district?

Joint Consultation : Is it possible in all industries? (Building, for example?) Is it done in your district?

Local Action. If the discussion is profitable, can its results be used to influence the managements of works in your district? Can it be made a live issue in your locality? How?

BRITAIN at the MOVIES

by SINCLAIR ROAD

Recently, a fascinating and informative book called *America at the Movies* by Margaret Thorp was reprinted in this country. It was first published in 1939 and provides a wealth of detail about the social influence and commercial ramifications of the film industry. Although it is concerned primarily with the American scene, there is a great deal in it which we in this country should take notice of. In particular, we should note the example.

Film-going in Britain is higher today than it has ever been. Each week well over 25 million attendances are recorded at Britain's 4,700 cinemas, an attendance figure which is second only to America's. The total seating capacity, however, is the largest in the world; it works out at one seat to every 10 persons in the country. To supply the demands of the cinemas some 500 long feature films, a couple of thousand short films are required each year, plus a newsreel a week from five companies. The gross receipts accruing from this film business in Britain are approximately £110 million, of which some £37 million goes into the Exchequer in the form of Entertainment Tax, and of the balance about £20 million nett passes to Hollywood in respect of the hire of its films.

Despite the fact that very large numbers of people are prepared to pay these relatively large sums of money to see films, far more than for any other kind of entertainment, too little is known about the receiving end of the business. It is most important to recognise at the outset how limited is the public's choice in the matter of films. The press offers a selection of about a dozen national dailies alone, and numberless provincial papers and periodicals reflecting every kind of taste and opinion. The radio gives access not only to the programmes of the B B C but also to foreign stations. By comparison the cinema appears narrow and sectarian. If one lives in London one has at least a chance of going to the West End cinemas, or to the specialised cinemas which show continental films. But if one does not live in London or one of the main provincial cities, one is restricted entirely to the programmes provided by the ordinary local cinemas. A certain number of these will probably belong to one or other of the big circuits and run the same programme and the choice is thereby reduced even further. But the limitation goes further than the number of different programmes offered. It applies equally to the type of films provided. By way of explanation one can point to the central control which is exercised over the supply of films by the eight or nine big renting companies in London, to the domination of Hollywood with its set types of film and forms of expression, to the exhibitors' desire for easy profits with the minimum of effort or even to the apparent willingness of the public to take whatever it is offered with such docility. But although we may know how these limitations arise and the disadvantages, we do not know in sufficient detail

what type and length of programmes and under what conditions, are being offered to the public in different parts of the country, let alone what improvements or modifications could be introduced.

In an attempt to see whether it was possible to give a few answers to these questions the Film Group of the Fabian Society approached the Board of Trade some time ago and obtained permission to conduct a sample analysis of the quota returns under the 1938 Cinematograph Films Act. These returns are completed each week by every exhibitor (i.e., Cinema-Manager) in the country to satisfy the Board of Trade that he is fulfilling the quota of British long and short films required under the Act. A sample analysis of the returns from 450 cinemas was conducted for the week ending 18th March 1945.

ANALYSIS OF EXHIBITORS' RETURNS

The regional distribution of the sample gave a very good spread. The Kinematograph Year Book gives a total of 4,825 cinemas in Great Britain but some of these were closed at the time of the analysis and the 460 cinemas for which details were supplied represents about 10 per cent of the cinemas functioning at that time. The period for which the analysis was made tends to some extent to detract from the value of the material. The war in Europe was not over and some cinemas were closed which would be functioning in more normal times. Nor is it possible to say on the basis of the material available whether the end of the war brought any change in exhibitors' policies or in the number of programmes shown.

The cinemas contained in the sample included the following numbers of large circuit cinemas:—

Gaumont British 19, Odeon 30, A B C 28, Union 11.

This entails a slight under-representation of Gaumont-British compared with the Odeon, and in consequence a slightly smaller percentage of circuit cinemas than there are in practice.

The types of cinemas range from those showing films for less than 11 hours a week to those showing films for 80 hours a week. The distribution of types of cinemas was as follows:—

Range of Hours per week	*Number of cinemas*
0–10	4
11–20	39
21–30	89
31–40	107
41–50	85
51–60	102
61–70	29
71–80	5
	460

The cinemas were analysed by the number of programmes shown each week. This has the disadvantage that the Sunday programmes are in this way given the same value as the week-day programmes. It would be an advantage if a similar analysis could be carried out with more up to date material, with the Sunday programmes treated as a separate problem. The distribution of cinemas according to the number of programmes shown in the sample week was as follows:—

Number of Programmes in the week	*Number of Cinemas*	*Total number of Programmes shown*
One programme	36	36
Two programmes	248	496
Three programmes	158	479
Four programmes	18	72

A little over half the cinemas were therefore running two programmes a week (i.e., one from Monday to Saturday, with a change on Sunday), and just over a third running three programmes (i.e., with a mid-week change as well).

The total number of films shown in the 1,078 programmes was 2,629, an average of 2.4 films per programme. (All newsreels and paid advertising films are excluded from this figure.) The distribution of the 2,629 films according to length was as follows:—

Under 3,000 feet, 35.1%; over 3,000 feet, 64.9%

The distribution of British films according to origin show a higher proportion in the " under 3,000 feet " group than in the " over 3,000 feet ". The figures are :—

	under 3,000 *feet*	*over* 3,000 *feet*
British ..	23.8%	16.9%
Foreign ..	76.2%	83.1%

A feature of the distribution of films according to origin is the substantially higher proportion of British films on show at the " one programme " cinemas, and the lower proportion showing at the " four programme " cinemas. The figures are:—

Cinemas showing	*number of films*	*British films* %	*Foreign films* %
One programme ..	91	30.7	69.3
Two programmes ..	1,195	18.2	81.8
Three programmes ..	1,160	19.5	80.5
Four programmes ..	183	16.9	83.1

In the sample week the 36 " one programme " cinemas showed 91 films, each film receiving an average of 15.9 showings. The 248 " two programme " cinemas showed 1,195 films with an average number of showings per film of 7.8. The 158 " three programme " cinemas showed 1,160 films with an average of 4.9 showings per film. The 18 " four programme " cinemas showed 183 films with an average number of showings of 3.1.

Information has been supplied as to the number of cases in which one film was shown at more than one cinema. From these figures it appears that the number of films in circulation in the 460 cinemas in the sample was as follows:—

British	312
Foreign	1,579
	1,891

This gives an average requirement for the sample week of 4.1 films per cinema.

This is a very brief summary of the kind of details which can be obtained from the quota returns. More information could without question be extracted. It should be possible to make up from the returns a fairly accurate picture of the type of film entertainment being offered to the public, as well as a lot of useful facts of market research value to the industry. This is a job which the Board of Trade might well undertake. The regular analysis of the quota returns could provide valuable guidance on such questions as the modifications which might be made in the type, length and number of programmes given per week so as to give the public more variety in its film entertainment and at the same time to reduce the dependence on American films.

THE NEED FOR FACTUAL RESEARCH

Thé need to provide more factual information about the film business is an urgent one. The one comprehensive statistical analysis by S. Rowson was carried out in 1936. In 1937 an invaluable study of the conomic and financial organisation of the film industry, *Money Behind the Screen*, was published. More recently there have been a number of pamphlets, dealing particularly with monopoly developments in the industry. But it should be remembered that the cinema is more than the largest entertainment industry. It is also the medium through which the tastes and opinions of the vast majority of people in this country are being formed every day of the week. The cinema is in fact one of the most important social phenomena of our age. That is why it is so important to discover far more about its organisation and workings, particularly from the receiving end, either by statistical analysis such as the one instanced above, or by the various means that are available for examining cinema-audiences, and their composition, habits and reactions.

One should be careful of taking such analysis to the length of trying to prove that such and such are the real tastes and preferences of the average cinema-goer, bearing in mind the restrictions on the average cinema-goer's choice and the fact that normally he or she sees only one type of programme and has little opportunity of judging what other types of film might appeal. There have been a number of enquiries of this kind; in particular the report issued a few months ago by Sidney Bernstein, the owner of the Granada circuit of cinemas. Then there is the private investigation which was conducted prior to the large scale press campaign now being conducted by the Rank organisation. What

is required is a really impartial study of film-going, both statistical and sociological in the sense of Margaret Thorp's book.

The need for such information is not only a long term sociological requirement. It is a matter of particular concern at the moment. The dependence on Hollywood films and the mounting expenditure of dollars involved demand a solution. New legislation to replace the existing Cinematograph Films Act is due at the end of this year. Here is both the need and the opportunity for modifying the cinema programmes normally offered to the public, to reduce the one-sided dependence on America, and to provide in the ordinary cinemas a more varied and better balanced selection of films, more documentary, cartoon or comedy films, also more films from other countries and not merely America. Britain at the Movies is a complex and absorbing problem; but it cannot be left to look after itself.

● *FOR YOUR DISCUSSION GROUP*

'The Need for Factual Research' How far do audiences choose their film? How soon does a disliked film show a drop in attendances? Can critics 'kill a film'? What types of film does your neighbourhood never get a chance to see? How do attendances vary with day of the week, weather, month of the year, locality, etc.?

Not all these questions can be answered by a direct 'quantitative' measurement. Can any of them be so measured?

Are there any 'independent' cinemas in your district? How do they choose the films they show? How can such choice be influenced? What are the prospects for a 'civic cinema' in your area?

Local Action. Is local research into this problem needed? Can a local Fabian or other group do it? Will its results be useful and to whom should they be sent?

● HOUSING—

Some Neglected Aspects

by MARIANNE WALTER, A.R.I.B.A., A.M.T.P.I.

> "A total production plan, ... needs as its foundation a family curve giving a prognosis of how many, how large and in what stage of life will be the families to be housed . . ."
>
> —Alva Myrdal.

The basis of a comprehensive housing programme should be an estimation of the requirements of the people. A long-term programme should furthermore be frequently reviewed in the light of changing requirements, and these also should constantly be reviewed. Surveys of existing properties and their occupation, rent and income structure, taken together with the estimates of needs, would furnish Housing Authorities with a picture of the housing scene in their area.

A proper estimation of requirements, the first and most difficult step, is not usually undertaken by Housing Authorities at all. Three different aspects have to be enquired into to arrive at the basic figures of requirements:

1 What are the kinds of households, or families or social groups that require a separate dwelling—or in other words, *whom* do we want to house?

This is a predominantly sociological aspect, but as we shall see it is interwoven with town planning and even building technology.

2 What types of dwellings, what sorts of houses, flats, etc., would best meet the needs of these basic groups?

This is a question which involves economic problems as well as those of town planning and architecture.

3 How many of each of these groups are there in the population? How are they distributed? What groups are increasing, which declining, and where and how? In other words, what trends are there and what is their geographical, what their economic and social pattern?

This last, predominantly statistical, aspect of the problem will become really useful only when the first two questions have been answered —but as so often, the obvious has not been seriously questioned and only the last aspect has been the subject of a very small number of competent investigations—and this only in very recent years. This

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My acknowledgments for valuable material are due to the Town Clerk of Chesterfield, the Staff of Glossop Corporation and to the architects of Rotherham R.D.C.—(M.W.)

lack of knowledge is just beginning to be recognised. The first (and up to the time of writing the only) book (in England) on the demographic statistical aspects referred to is the excellent work by Alexander Block, *Estimating Housing Needs* (1946) which ought to be studied by all students of housing. The growth of populations is the only aspect so far studied, but about its differentiation into groups, their various needs of privacy and companionship, so necessary for estimation of housing requirements, there is very little knowledge.

This lack of knowledge has led to an enormous wastage of house-room, to an enormous overprovision of the medium sized three-bedroom house, which is not so much a luxury as a burden for many small households—sometimes it is too small and often it is too large, and many bedrooms stand empty at a time of acute housing shortage; its plan and grouping too is often unsuitable for the small or adult household.

ERRORS AND DISCREPANCIES

The Housing Reports of the Census were based on the definition of the " private family " which is not a family in the proper sense of the word, but rather a household—and not a voluntarily composed household, but one arising from causes such as housing shortage, especially of small dwellings. It is surely begging the question to make such households the basis of estimates of housing needs ! The English Census does not furnish all the data required for population analyses, but the " Population (Statistics) Act " 1938 will furnish more detailed data, though the more comprehensive Bill was unfortunately reduced on account of Parliamentary criticism.

The provision of three-bedroom houses before the war varied from about 75 per cent to 98 per cent (at Norris Green, Liverpool) of the total of dwellings, whilst the percentage of applicant families in Liverpool needing three-bedroom houses was only 43 per cent of the total. 47 per cent of the applicant families required one and two-bedroom dwellings, but only 1.5 per cent two-bedroom dwellings were provided. (See N. Williams, *Population Problems of New Estates*, Social Science Department, Liverpool University.)

The Rotherham R D C found in 1946 that 2,575 houses in their area were inhabited by single people or childless couples, while 1,645 families were without homes of their own; there were 501 houses occupied by single persons, and 843 houses capable of accommodating eight or more persons were occupied by one and two-person adult households. It is quite conceivable that if Rotherham R D C were to build a thousand flats or cottage flats at £875 each, they could rehouse a thousand of their overcrowded families in existing houses, too large for their present inhabitants. Even if they would allow another £75 for the reconditioning of each older house, they would yet save £350 per dwelling (a three-bedroom house costs about £1,300 to build) provided, of course, that the respective areas and rents facilitate such a move of house of roughly one-third of the under-crowded households.

THE CHANGING SHAPE OF THE FAMILY

It is, of course, not just a question of saving building material and labour—though this kind of argument is more willingly listened to than any other ! It is a long and complex social process that has led to the present perplexing situation.

Until now, dwellings were built on the whole for group families. Until the 19th century, moreover, dwellings were mostly built for families that one knew, about whose habits and social status there was as little doubt as about the numbers of children and adults that would pass through them in the course of everchanging generations. Since man began to live in specially constructed permanent abodes, the group of people for whom they were built has undergone great changes. In the middle ages and the Renaissance *the "family" that occupied a dwelling was really a community* of producers and consumers—it included many occupational and all age groups, servants, apprentices, craftsmen and labourers were part of it—some temporarily, many throughout whole generations. The organisation of labour in the factory system split off apprentices, and other workers, while it reduced wives and servants to those remaining domestic occupations which had not yet become industrialised and specialised.

The differentiation of the family (*and during a long period this means a decreasing size*) *appears to be an intrinsic part of social evolution.* The primitive Clan often included both the living and the dead (see Levy Bruhl: *The Soul of the Primitive*), and the portrait galleries of ancient ancestors in the houses of the aristocracy may be regarded as a remnant of this inclusive consciousness (see also Jung).

The Patriarchal Family, which included grandparents as well as collaterals, led, no doubt, to the Census definition of the "private Family" which is still used in the County of London Plan (1943) as the basic unit for housing. Contrast this family with the recent statement of Mr Bevan that the 'mother-in-law' is the root of the evil, i.e., the housing problem ! The older group family has split up into smaller and much more specialised groups, corresponding to the growth of a specialised and complex urban civilisation.

Occupation is becoming a major social factor (according to Professor T. S. Simey, Liverpool, 80 per cent of all friendships are made at work —i.e., away from the home), and at both ends of life the functions of the family are somewhat diminishing. (I agree with Professor MacIver that this may help the biological family better to fulfil its peculiar personal function.) In the past women were occupied with bearing children from 17 to the age of 45 or till they died. According to Jane Austen (*Northanger Abbey*) they lost their health, or at least their temper and looks, after the third or fourth child—and according to Adam Smith (*The Wealth of Nations*) had often buried well over half by the time they stopped being either pregnant or nursing mothers.

The child-rearing span in women's lives has been reduced by birth control and schools from about 30 years to about 10 years, out of an increased total of well over 60 years. Schools and ready-to-wear clothes have reduced the usefulness of the unmarried aunt to the family. Hence women have increasingly entered the occupational scene and contribute to the perplexity of the statistician who is trying to discover how many

dwellings and what sorts we need, or in other words how many families and households there are and of what kinds. A better education for the younger generation further tends to increase the desire for " privacy " and separateness from the older generation.

THE TREND TOWARDS SMALLER HOUSEHOLDS

These considerations—though fragmentary for reasons of space—have, I hope, made it clear that a purely statistical approach to the problem of dwelling types is insufficient. To enumerate " families " up to the 16th century in England would have meant the enumeration of small " communities ", living, eating and sleeping together in the great hall, with a bed-chamber for the lord and his lady only. But today it means the discovery of a great variety of small and rather specialised households, of which the family in the modern biological sense (including parents and children only) is only one, if the most important, type.

According to the Housing Report of the 1931 Census there existed 1·7 million households of two or more persons NOT containing a married couple. The Government Social Survey 1945 (which has just become available) does not recognise such households as needing separate dwellings of their own, although their number is likely to be greater now. It splits the biological family from " non family members " and thus establishes the housing needs of the " biological family ". We do not know what the housing needs of the " non family members " are which are referred to in such negative terms by the Government Social Survey. (It is available now on application from the Director of Research, The Social Survey, 39 41, Nottingham Place, W 1.) The Survey found such " non members " in 10 per cent of households of the " up to £3 " economic group and in 20 per cent of the " £10 and over " economic group. A good deal more research is needed here, before we can make a statistical guess of their housing needs. That this cannot be fruitfully done by the opinion survey method, I have tried to show in an earlier article in this Journal. (" The Right Use of Opinion Surveys," 1944.) The difficulty is, of course, that not only the sizes but also the kinds of households will continuously change, and there is evidence for the view that *the provision of new dwelling types and the changing pattern of dwelling types in a town will bring new kinds of households into being.* Occupational opportunities for women, school hours and catering facilities, improved heating and cleaning apparatus, industrial and professional specialisation, and the great increase in the proportion of men and women over 65 from 6·2 per cent of the total population in 1901 to 20·8 per cent in 1971 (estimate of the Beveridge Report, 1942) will further enhance changes in the kinds and requirements of households. Even without taking into account this voluntary kind of differentiation, the population forecasts, which are based on the purely biological structure of the population, show a considerable increase in the numbers of small households and a decline in the 4- and more person households; even where a decline in the total population is assumed, *the number of households will still increase for a considerable time.* (See, for instance, the *City of Manchester Plan*, 1945, pp. 22–31.)

THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MANCHESTER PLANNERS

Pending further research in this field, Cities have to make plans, however, and it is necessary to make certain assumptions as to how the housing needs of people can best be satisfied. Sometimes they may get a shock, as the Doncaster City fathers must have got when they had 25 old people's dwellings ready for occupation and only five old people (out of 25) were willing to move out of the " work house " into the new flats ! (1947). Let us see though, what the assumptions of the Manchester planners mean in terms of the figures supplied by the fairly large sample of the Government Social Survey.

They assume (p. 30) " that all families with children under 14 should have dwelling houses, that childless married couples in the lower age groups should be accommodated mainly in houses; that parents with children over 14 should have houses, cottage flats or flats; that elderly couples without children will increasingly prefer flats or old people's cottages; that widows especially those with one or two young children will generally like cottage flats "* ; and that most other adults will want to live in flats or maisonettes. (See Table I.)

TABLE I

ESTIMATE OF DWELLING TYPES REQUIRED PER CENT

Household Type	*Household Units per cent (as in Gov. Social Survey)*	*Dwelling Types*
Young married couples, no children	11%	
Families with children under 19 years	27%	
	38%	of dwellings to be houses (there are 62% of persons in this group.)
Elderly Married couples without children under 19	12%	flats or cottage-flats
Widows with children under 19	3%	cottage flats
Single persons, widows, older single persons	47%	in various types of flats
	62%	of dwellings to be various types of flats. (there are 38% of persons in this group.)
	100%	All dwellings

Table I is based on the figures of the Social Survey (1945), where the basic unit for housing is the biological family, i.e., all persons who are neither a parent of a child under 19 years, nor a child under 19 years are excluded from the family and termed " non family members ". These persons therefore swell the numbers of the single persons, as compared with other surveys and estimates, e.g., Manchester, where they have

* In the actual recommendations only a small percentage of flats are proposed by the Manchester Planners.

been included in the " family " unit, whenever they have been found living with a family (except for " Lodgers ").

Table II is based on estimates in the Manchester Plan of the household units per cent for 1961. This estimate had as its only source of information the Billeting Survey in Manchester which was the first Survey supplying such information as was required by the Manchester planners. It defined children as persons under 14 years, while the Government Social Survey includes children up to 19 years. The Social Survey " family with children " would therefore be a slightly higher percentage as compared with Manchester, but Manchester's estimate of single persons must be rather lower than that of the Social Survey as has been explained.

TABLE II

HOUSEHOLD UNITS PER CENT ESTIMATED FOR MANCHESTER IN 1961

Total Number in household (adults and children)	*Households without children* %	*Households with children* %	*Totals of households* %
1	10·8	—	10·8
2	24·5	0·7	25·2
3	15·1	9·7	24·8
4	10·2	13·2	23·4
5	3·6	6·2	9·8
6	1·3	2·5	3·8
Over	0·5	1·7	2·2
Totals	66%	34%	100%

To most people concerned with housing the Manchester figures may appear to overestimate both the small household and the childless household—but as the Manchester planners admit themselves, if these figures err, they err on the conservative side. Compare Manchester's estimate for people over 65 in 1971 as 10·25 per cent of the population with the estimate of the Registrar General of 17·1 per cent old people in 1971 (*Current Trends of Population in Great Britain*, 1942) or with the Beveridge Report which estimates 20·8 per cent old people in the population in 1971 ! If this report is right there will be a *much* higher percentage of small and childless households in the population than even the Manchester planners envisage.

THE ESTIMATES COMPARED

Table III is a comparison of various estimates in a rough and ready way; strictly speaking these estimates are not comparable at all

because their definitions vary, or, as in the case of Glossop, they are calculated from an analysis by the former Medical Officer of Health of Glossop, Dr Milligan, of the families of applicants, but obviously this cannot be taken as the state of families in Glossop generally, as it depends largely on the types of dwellings offered by the Corporation; Glossop's consideration for single and old persons has led to a considerable increase in enquiries from such people in the last year !

The Census and the L C C plan use the so-called " private family " as their basis and, as has been explained, this leads to an underestimate of the small and single person household.

While some of the single persons of the Social Survey Unit may form one-, or two-, or even three-person adult households sometimes, the trend is undoubtedly towards an increase in the number of small households and this particular column gives in my view the truest picture; it was based on a sample of over 40,000 persons.

TABLE III

ESTIMATED HOUSEHOLD UNITS PER CENT

No. in Household	*Glossop applicants* 1946	*Census Housing report* 1931	*L C C Plan* 1943	*War-time Social Survey Scotland*	*Social Survey* 1945
1	1·3	6·7	3·5	7	47
2	24·5	21·9	19·5	17	25
3	27·0	24·1	27·0	22	15
4	23·6	19·4	22·5	21	8
5	12·9	12·4	12·5	14	3
6	6·3	7·3		7	1
7	1·4	4·1		5	over
8	2·0	2·1		3	
over	1·0	2·0		3	1
	100·0%	100·0%	—	100%	100%

According to Mrs Ruth Glass (see *Architect's Journal*, 10th April, 1947, p. 299) 70 per cent three-bedroom dwellings were approved by the Ministry of Health up to September 1946, and one Town Clerk writes to me: " Our experience has been that the Ministry have favoured something like 80 per cent of contracts being for three-bedroom type houses . . . . . " It is impossible for me, for reasons of space, to do more than contrast the various findings without sufficient comments on their significance. In an article on " Flats, their Numbers, Types and Distribution " in the *Architect's Journal*, February 6th, 1947, I have gone into some details of the planning aspects of a high proportion of small dwellings.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF DWELLING TYPES

One word about the tendency of many Housing Authorities to build a very high proportion of three-bedroom houses on outlying " estates " and most of their small dwellings in central areas. It is certainly the traditional picture, but whether it will result in a desirable kind of pattern might usefully form the subject of sociological research (see also the writer's article, " The Housing Estate, a Warning ", in the *Contemporary Review*, May, 1945.) It is certainly a pattern which tends to increase mobility—as people move from one family stage to another (e.g., from the bachelor to the married couple, etc.) this pattern encourages (or forces) a move into a different part of the town. While a certain amount of general mobility is now accepted as the *sine qua non* of full employment, it may be open to doubt whether it should be encouraged *inside* a town. The tendency to move from one area to another inside a town tends to break down the group control of the individual; to quote just one study, Professor Mowrer finds that in the City of Chicago there is a " close relationship between family disorganisation and mobility" (*Family Disorganisation and Mobility*. Publications of the American Sociological Society, Vol. 23) and many studies bear witness to the correlation of family disorganisation and crime (not only in the Chicago of Gangster fame !) especially amongst the young. (See also D. Glass: *The Town*, London, 1935.) Professor R. M. MacIver (*Society*, London, 1937) finds some correlation between the divorce rate and mobility—he states (p. 218 English Edition): " The mobility of life so characteristic of the United States, and particularly of the West, has weakened this sense of (social) continuity. It weakens also the external pressure of public opinion." I would further venture the view that group control is not exercised by all groups equally or in the same directions, and that it is the family, especially the family which has reached a certain social status, that may be the most potent factor in social control. Hence to remove the family from certain central areas where flats and lodgings predominate, must tend to remove social control and civic consciousness from these areas—quite apart from increasing mobility.

I do not wish to advocate a higher proportion of small dwellings without drawing attention to the social difficulties which may arise out of a careless maldistribution (such as wholesale conversions into flats of older property districts), difficulties which will doubtless increase where the town pattern continues to follow the price structure of the land as it has done in the past. The influence of the rating system in this respect is quite pernicious and the abolition of its present form would remove a truly formidable obstacle to civic reconstruction.

CONCLUSION

That the town and the pattern of dwellings and other buildings has a formative influence upon its inhabitants is not difficult to understand, but it is not so easy to assess either single factors or resulting social trends. Lewis Mumford (especially in *The Culture of Cities*, London, 1938, and *Technique and Civilisation*) has brilliantly analysed the impact

of Megalopolis upon modern man—but his very brilliance seems to have carried him to rather facile conclusions with insufficient evidence to support them—and even less does he furnish us with practical propositions where housing and town planning are concerned. The fundamental question which the town planner must ask is: *What can the town contribute towards social integration*—and " social integration " does not mean quite the same to different people. Pestalozzi, the Swiss educationist, has, I think, done some fruitful thinking on this question, and concluded that part of the problem lies in the activating of the citizens in a smaller neighbourhood. A Housing Society was recently formed in this area (the " Dronfield Pioneer Health and Housing Society ") with these problems in mind, and its object is to create a new Neighbourhood with the active participation of the (future) tenant members in all respects. and a Family Health Centre of the Peckham type is to become the live focus of the Community. Such an experiment may be extremely valuable in several respects, and also throw new light on questions of social grouping and dwelling types.

Alva Myrdal (*Nation and Family*, London, 1945) stresses the educational value of the Swedish Housing (consumer) Co-operatives, which have proved to be of educational value and have made quite important contributions to the planning of, *and* mode of living in, houses (and flats). *The differentiation of family group, the growth of single persons and small households may dangerously increase the sense of isolation of the individual, with resulting decline in mental stability and mental health* (see Dr J. Halliday: " Psychosomatic Medicine and the declining birth rate ", *Lancet*, 1945) *and even social disintegration.* Whether the cure lies in the Reilly Unit or in the direction of the Dronfield Experiment *—much more thought than was considered necessary in the past* by those working out policies in terms of housing production and planning programmes *is needed now, at a time when the structure of the population is undergoing vast and far-reaching changes.*

● *FOR YOUR DISCUSSION GROUP*

Whom do we want to house ?

What sort of houses do they need ?

How are these needs changing—in members and in locality ?

Is there room for local research on these points ? How should it be carried out ? If answers can be found, to whom should they be sent ? Who can act on the results of such research ?

COMMUNISTS against the KUOMINTANG

Which side can win?

by MICHAEL LINDSAY

Developments of recent months in the Chinese civil war seem to indicate a shift in the relative strength of the two parties. To begin with, the Kuomintang seemed to have a very great superiority for any kind of regular warfare. The Kuomintang armies had always had much better equipment and supplies of ammunition than the Communist armies, and this difference was very much increased by American assistance both before and after V-J Day. By the time of the Japanese surrender, twenty Kuomintang divisions had received American equipment and training and during the period of large-scale American intervention, the number of Kuomintang troops with American equipment and some American training was increased to over 700,000. (The term " large-scale American intervention " describes the results of American action. The Americans have a technical defence against charges of intervention through the arguments that supplies delivered to the Kuomintang after V-J Day either came under commitments entered into before the Japanese surrender or else were surplus property which were not, strictly speaking, military supplies. Also that the landing of American troops and transporting of Kuomintang armies was only assistance to the Chinese government in disarming and repatriating the Japanese, and the fact that this assistance was actually used not to disarm the Japanese but to fight the civil war was the responsibility of the Chinese and not of the American government.) On the other side, the Communists south of the Great Wall managed to capture a certain amount of Japanese equipment after the surrender, mostly from puppet armies, but probably only a small part of their army even reached the standard of equipment of the Kuomintang divisions which had not received American supplies. It was only in Manchuria that large quantities of Japanese equipment were taken over and even there the amount may not have been much more than was necessary to equip the Communist forces in Manchuria.

THE EARLY MONTHS OF CIVIL WAR

The basic position in 1945 seemed similar to that which the Communists faced against the Japanese in 1938. A much better equipped enemy held the big cities and most of the railways, while the Communists held most of the countryside. The situation was rather more favourable to the Communists; their areas and their army were much larger than in 1938, and the Kuomintang did not have the complete control of the North China railway network that the Japanese had after the middle

of 1938. Also the Kuomintang army was never as serious an opponent as the Japanese army. Only a few of the best American trained divisions had been able to meet the Japanese on anywhere near equal terms.

It seemed likely, however, that the course of the civil war would be similar to the course of the war against the Japanese. So long as the American trained Kuomintang armies held together and the Communist army remained short of equipment, the Kuomintang would be able to capture any positions they wanted to, provided they were prepared to pay the price. In the fighting before the Truce Agreement of January 1946, the former puppet armies seemed to be no match for the Communists

when they had to fight without Japanese stiffening, and the regular Kuomintang armies suffered some serious local defeats when they advanced too rapidly to positions where the Communists could cut their communications; but the Kuomintang was successful in taking its main objectives. The Kuomintang armies secured control of a large part of the railways and broke into Manchuria through the Communist defences at Shanhaikuan.

AFTER THE TRUCE AGREEMENT

When fighting started again in April 1946 the Communists had a temporary advantage in Manchuria, where the Kuomintang forces were still weak, but apparently lost this when Kuomintang reinforcements arrived. The Communists claim that they voluntarily abandoned Changchun when Chiang Kai-shek made its capture a condition for the renewal of the Truce Agreement, but though they could no doubt have held out for some time longer, it is doubtful if they could have defended Changchun permanently. Inside the Great Wall, the Communist position was almost certainly weaker in April than it had been in January as they had carried out a considerable amount of demobilisation under the Army Reorganisation Agreement. (One of the points in the breakdown of the system of agreements was a dispute in which Chou En-lai claimed that the Communists had actually demobilised nearly a third of their regular army in several of their main areas, while Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, the secretary general of the Kuomintang, admitted that almost all Kuomintang demobilisation had taken the form of transferring army units into " Labour Brigades ".) When large-scale fighting was resumed after the complete breakdown of the Truce Agreements, the Kuomintang made considerable gains, including the capture of Kalgan and of all the main positions in North Kiangsu. One Communist statement at the beginning of this year said that the Kuomintang had captured over 180,000 square kilometres of Communist territory of which nearly 70,000 were in Manchuria.

Even when the Kuomintang was being most successful, the claims of Kuomintang generals that they could finish the war in six months were obviously wishful thinking. The Japanese had held all the railways by 1938 and by the end of 1939 they had captured nearly all the hsien cities except in the mountain areas, but this was only the beginning of their biggest anti-Communist campaigns. Both in the Kuomintang campaigns in the earlier civil war and in the Japanese campaigns in North China, the real struggle had come in the process of reducing the Communist base areas by gradually advancing a network of forts and blockade lines. This was the only effective method of dealing with an army that was expert in guerilla warfare but it was a slow and expensive process. The close network of forts tied up very large forces, which suffered a steady drain in small engagements which became especially heavy when the village militia had developed into an effective fighting force and had become expert in land mine warfare. Up to the autumn of 1943 the Japanese were gaining against the Communists but as soon as they relaxed their efforts in North China they started to lose at an

increasing rate. By V J Day they actually controlled less of North China than they had in 1940 at the start of their biggest anti-Communist campaigns.

Even if the Kuomintang retained its great superiority in positional warfare, it would be a matter of years, at the quickest, before it could eliminate the Communist armies. In fact, the Kuomintang might well have lost in a war of attrition. Even against the Japanese, the Communists managed to maintain a favourable casualty ratio and the Kuomintang would find it hard to keep its army up to strength and to prevent it from becoming demoralised when scattered in small garrisons in Communist areas, especially as the Kuomintang cannot solve the economic crisis until it reconquers the countryside and reduces military expenditure. Economic difficulties are much more serious for the developed Kuomintang cities than for the largely self-sufficient Communist countryside and, so long as war time taxation and conscription continue, there would be enough discontent in Kuomintang-controlled country areas for the Communists to have a good chance of spreading guerilla activities and forcing still further dispersion of the Kuomintang army and a reduction in its resources.

KUOMINTANG GAINS AND THE CAPTURE OF YENAN

The surprising development in the last few months has been the apparent weakness of the Kuomintang army even in positional warfare. They have not even been successful in keeping control of the railways. They have not yet managed to clear either of the two north-south lines, the Peiping–Hankow and the Tientsin–Pukow. Since last autumn they have several times temporarily lost control of important stretches of the northern section of the Peiping–Hankow railways between Peiping and Shihchiachuang, the junction for the railway into Shansi. The same is true of the Tungpu railway running north and south of Shansi and the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway in Shantung. Even the key Peiping-Tientsin line has often been interrupted. Even more striking has been the comparative failure of the Kuomintang offensives in Shantung. In October and November 1946 there was a considerable Kuomintang offensive in the Shantung peninsula and at one time it was reported that Kuomintang troops were on the point of capturing Cheefoo but recent reports seem to indicate that the area is still under Communist control. The offensives in Central Shantung to clear the Tientsin-Pukow railway also seem to have failed and the Kuomintang admitted the loss of two divisions and of the commander of a third.

At present the Kuomintang is still on the offensive in Shantung but does not appear to be making any rapid gains, while the Communists on the whole seem to be able to retain the initiative in Shansi and Manchuria.

The only rapid Kuomintang advances in recent campaigns were in the offensive against Yenan and this was essentially a side show in the overall military situation. By the summer of 1938 the area round Yenan had become one of the smallest of the Communist bases but Yenan remained the Communist capital because it was in the one area not

subject to periodic Japanese penetration. The Yellow river and the very mountainous country on both sides of it provided a very strong natural defence line so that, while the Japanese could almost certainly have captured Yenan, it would have required a major offensive and involved heavy losses. In all the main Communist base areas the army and government organisations and the small-scale armament factories functioned fairly efficiently in spite of periodic Japanese offensives so the Japanese apparently realised that the loss of Yenan would only have been a minor inconvenience to the Communists which would not have justified a major offensive. However, the Yenan area has not natural defences in the south and west corresponding to the Yellow river in the east and so was not especially easily defended against Kuomintang attack and the Communists do not seem to have considered it worth while committing large forces to the defence of what was essentially an outlying area with a small population and no great economic or strategic importance.

The real significance of the Yenan campaign was political. It ended the situation in which communications between the two parties at the top levels remained fairly easy in spite of widespread fighting and so marked the end of any hopes of an agreed settlement on the Kuomintang side. It was really equivalent to a declaration of all-out civil war. Recent reports from China indicate that the attack on Yenan was opposed by the moderate elements in the Kuomintang and that the decision to undertake it was a result of the strengthening of the Kuomintang extremists by recent developments in American policy towards Russia which were considered to imply the resumption of large-scale intervention in China.

RELATIVE STRENGTHS IN 1947

The very limited success of the Kuomintang in the main areas of fighting seems to indicate a considerable change in the relative strengths of the two armies. Last summer it would have been reasonable to suppose that the Kuomintang was strong enough to hold all the main railway lines and that when they were prepared to use a force running into hundreds of thousands, as they have been in the Shantung offensive, they could rapidly penetrate any Communist area and at least capture all the cities even if they could not eliminate the Communist armies or control the countryside. This certainly does not seem to be the case now either in North China or Manchuria.

A clue to the reasons for this development is contained in the Communist war claims. In the early stages of the war their obvious strategy is to avoid large-scale positional battles with the better equipped enemy but to inflict the maximum possible losses on the Kuomintang armies. It has been clear that the important question has not been the capture of particular positions but whether the Kuomintang could capture them without weakening their relative strength.

The only figures available on relative losses have been those put out by the Communists. Although they are not complete they give the main outlines of the picture. The Communists claim that up to

October 1946 the Kuomintang had lost about 200,000 men killed, wounded and captured. In a more recent report they claim that, out of 219 divisions engaged against them, the Kuomintang had lost 48, one quarter of these being American trained divisions. They also claimed a casualty ratio of 8 : 1 in their favour in the fighting up to October 1946. Other figures giving monthly war results up to the end of last year claim Kuomintang losses of between 60,000 and 80,000 per month, about half prisoners or deserters. A communique in February 1947 gives a list of three Kuomintang full generals, six lieutenant generals and sixty-four major generals captured plus ten killed.

There is no way of checking these claims in detail, though in some cases the Kuomintang has admitted the loss or even the desertion of some divisions. However, these figures would explain the apparent change in the relative strength of the two armies. Kuomintang losses in prisoners would have given the Communists a great deal of new equipment. The claims of ammunition captured are in the millions of rounds per month which is large by the standards of the Communist army. (During a year of the heaviest fighting against the Japanese the Eighth Route Army only used three million rounds of ammunition.) There have also been captures of artillery and even of tanks.

It is therefore probable that the strength of the Communist army has grown while the Kuomintang army may have lost an appreciable proportion of their best troops and may gradually be losing its great superiority in equipment now that fresh American supplies are no longer coming in.

In the long run morale is one of the key factors but it is very hard to estimate. Some foreign correspondents have reported a decline in the morale of many Kuomintang units and one of the ablest Kuomintang generals in Manchuria was reported to have resigned. On the other hand, desertions do not show any immediate signs of reaching a scale which would have a decisive effect on the course of the war. There is even less information available from the Communist side. In areas where they have put through the new land redistribution policy they have obviously created a very strong vested interest against allowing the return of Kuomintang control. On the other hand, the turn to a more extremist land policy may have alienated moderate groups who would otherwise have supported them and may be making it more difficult to win over Kuomintang officers.

The other very obscure factor is the situation in South and West China. At the end of last year, Communist sources reported widespread peasant revolts in Szechuan, Yunnan, Kuangtung and other provinces. There were said to be guerilla bands, with a strength running sometimes into thousands, armed with rifles and sometimes even with machine guns and trench mortars. Since then there have been few reports except of widespread banditry, but for the outside observer, a guerilla organisation in its early stages is hard to distinguish from banditry. As there have been reports that the Kuomintang has been moving most of its forces out of South China to join in the main campaigns in the north, the possibility of a rapid growth of new Communist areas in the south is important.

SUMMER PROSPECTS

The spring and early summer are the best season for military operations in North China. The rainy season usually starts in the first half of July, and during July and August it is hard to move wheeled vehicles in the plains; moreover, throughout the summer high crops give a big advantage to guerilla activities and it is not till the end of September that conditions would again become favourable for a major Kuomintang offensive. Thus the next few months are likely to be a very important stage in the civil war. If the Kuomintang could clear the railways and get control of the main points in the strategic Central Shantung area, it would not end the war, but it might go a long way to restoring the position of a regular Kuomintang army fighting a Communist guerilla organisation. On the other hand, if the Kuomintang cannot make any important progress before the rainy season, their relative strength is likely to deteriorate still further. It might be some time before the Communists became strong enough to capture important Kuomintang-held cities or to win large positional battles by purely military operations, but there would probably be a point at which the deterioration in the Kuomintang position would end in quite a rapid collapse through desertions to get on the winning side.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION?

This estimate of the situation has been made on the assumption that there is no large-scale foreign intervention on either side. If large-scale American intervention is resumed, the civil war might go on almost indefinitely. With enough American assistance, the Kuomintang might manage to clear the railways, but they would find it very hard to eliminate guerilla organisation in the countryside unless they were prepared to compete with the Communists for popular support by a programme of far-reaching reforms. So long as the Kuomintang extremists felt that they could rely on American support it is extremely unlikely that they would undertake such a programme which would be directly against their vested interests.

There is also the possibility that American intervention on one side might lead to Russian intervention on the other. If the Russians once started supplying the Communists with ammunition, it would probably need American armies in China to prevent a Kuomintang defeat. Even though the total American strength may be considerably greater than the Russian, the situation in China is such that the Russians could exert a decisive influence on the course of the civil war at a small fraction of the cost which America would need to pay to counteract even limited Russian intervention. Russia need only send in some of their surplus war material in order to involve America in the sending of American troops. This consideration is, no doubt, one of the factors which has so far prevented the resumption of large-scale American intervention.

● BOOK REVIEWS

THE CITY'S FINANCES—*A Pictorial Summary* (City of Manchester, Treasurer's Department)

A first-rate attempt to explain the difficult-looking statistics of a Local Government's services in visual form. The pamphlet is even more valuable as an example of what can be done in this direction than it is as an exposition of the work of the city of Manchester; particular simplicity has been achieved in the diagram showing the meaning of the Consolidated Loans Fund Capital Account. To make such things interesting for the ordinary citizen to look at is indeed an achievement.

The Isotype-style blocks and layout were designed in the Treasurer's Department and are set out in many colours.

J. L. J.

A NATIONAL WAGES POLICY By C. A. Lidbury (Industrial Law Review, February 1947 2/–)

This short account of the methods of ' point rating ' as it might be applied within and between industries, is shortly to appear in book form. The advantages of the system, and the manner of applying it, are well worth study, and Mr Lidbury's thesis is a simple but not over-simplified introduction to the subject.

If generally accepted, the system would give flexibility to an overall wages policy, and would make it easy of application; but its acceptance needs a development in trade union outlook and organisation, as also an alteration in employers' ideas.

Thus, while attitudes more responsive to the use of some such method of wage regulation are likely to develop as socialisation proceeds, the present value of the essay is that it sets up a possible target, displays its advantages, and stimulates thought on a subject on which much thought is needed.

J. L. J.

IN DARKEST GERMANY By Victor Gollancz (Gollancz 8/6)

Most Fabians will have read at least part of Mr Gollancz' book already, for it is an edited collection of letters and articles submitted to the thinking man's press during his recent visit to Germany. Those who haven't yet read it, should do so, if only to study how an intelligent humanitarian, impassioned by a just and urgent cause, can drive his campaign to victory through the medium of respectable and comparatively little-read papers.

Gollancz won his case; and the Government now allows parcels of clothing and rationed food to be sent from this country to all zones in Germany. Also his campaign, however brief, helped to secure a more general recognition of the grim conditions in which German people now live. In these days, then, the frenzied and repetitive polemic of his book reads a little strangely, and it lacks the incisive and constructive approach to problems of food supply and economic revival which most readers will now desire.

J. C. G.

SHORT ECONOMIC HISTORY OF JAPAN By G. C. Allen (Allen & Unwin 10/6)

The opening chapters of this useful study are of general interest to sociologists as well as economic historians, being a sketch of early nineteenth century Japan's mixture of feudalism and small-scale industry against the broader social background. The later chapters are a more specialised study of the development of techniques, industrial and commercial in inter-war Japan, and are competent but do not fulfil the book's early promise.

D. M. S.

MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW WORK By G. W. Keeton and G. Schwarzenberger (Stevens 1946 12/6)

This work sets out the fundamental principles for inter-state relations, both those now existing and those necessary for a future world society, with a survey of past shortcomings and transgressions.

It is written in a manner understandable by both jurist and layman and is commended to all interested in foreign affairs. The compilation of the several statutes and treaties concluding this work is a marked feature.

R. S. W. P.

THE ANATOMY OF PEACE By Emery Reves (Allen & Unwin 7/6 Penguin 1/-)

This disturbing book has been a super best-seller in America, and translations are appearing all over the world. The central theme, epitomised, is: As long as there are several sovereign power units, several national authorities, they are bound to conflict, *no matter what their internal economic or social systems.* Neither Socialism nor Free Enterprise of itself can avert another world war; and religion has failed utterly in this respect.

The first chapter contains a salutary exposition of how international events between the two wars appear to Americans, British, French, Germans and Russians respectively. The author's conclusion is that this planet must to some degree be brought under unified control either by consent or by conquest of one group of nations over the other. "The era of inter-national wars will end, just as everything human ends. It will come to an end with the establishment of universal law to regulate human relationship, either by union or by—conquest".

This book, also published as Penguin, should certainly be read.

A. E. D.

A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM By David Mitrany (National Peace Council 2/-)

The pamphlet, which is a powerful plea for the development of international co-operation along functional lines, was written in 1943. It does not take into account the considerable post-war developments in this field. The writer believes that the great stumbling block in the way of effective international co-operation—national sovereignty—can best be avoided by concentrating on a strictly functional approach. The real difficulty, which is partly recognised in the pamphlet is that one of the functions must be security: it is difficult to prevent national differences and the patent inequality of nations in this respect, from overshadowing the working of all other functional bodies. This is in practice what has happened since the end of the war. The importance of functional co-operation has been amply recognised, as witness UNRRA, UNESCO, European Central Inland Transport Organisation, European Coal Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organisation, Provisional International Civil Aviation Organisation, International Refugees Organisation, World Health Organisation, International Trade Organisation and the Economic Commission of UNO. But all are partially or completely crippled by the political tension most clearly seen on the Security Council.

A. W.

FOOD, FAMINE AND RELIEF League of Nations 1946 (Allen & Unwin 6/-)

Food, Famine and Relief gives an account of food rationing (full details in appendix) and consumption throughout the world during the second world war, and levels of consumption in 1945–46. Discusses causes of the post-war crisis. Gives a table of shipments by UNRRA up to March 1946. Explains dependence of UNRRA on the Combined Food Board, but does not mention that consequent failure to accumulate food for relief contributed to scarcity in 1946. Gives data on health. Quotes the figures from *Food Consumption Levels in USA, Canada and United Kingdom* of food consumption per head in UK as though they were comparable with amounts of food bought by consumers abroad. But

these figures, for U K, are calculated from estimates of total production and imports and are about 20 per cent higher than the actual amount of food bought, per head, by consumers in the U K.

The same mistake was made in a Government White Paper. The reviewer is left wondering how many other data, which he cannot check from personal knowledge, may be equally incorrect and how far our economics may be jeopardized by similar figures, compiled by credulous statisticians who do not know what they mean, and quoted by politicians who have no time to go into details.

J. R. M.

THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL By E. H. L. Corwin (Oxford University Press $1.50)

America is facing the same problems in health that have led to the introduction of a National Health Service in this country. There is, therefore, a flood of literature describing the present situation of the health services of the United States and this book by a recognised expert on hospitals gives an immense amount of information about the hospital system. One has a suspicion that the author does not wish to condemn too strongly but the facts and figures he produces reveals a hospital situation in America even worse than in this country. One also has the feeling that the author, like a great many Americans, wishes to avoid the inevitable conclusion that private enterprise in health has so completely failed in the United States to provide an adequate service that it must be replaced by some State system.

Those who are interested in the subject of hospital provision must study this exceedingly detailed book and each one will pick out the deficiency in the hospital services which strikes him as being outstanding. For example, few British readers will know " that fifty-six per cent of the counties in the United States are without a hospital ". The distribution of hospital beds varies from one to just over a hundred people to one for a thousand people. From the fact that in the best served areas as many as ten beds per thousand are provided, most readers will conclude that the author is wrong in describing the average of the United States of one bed to 340 people as a " fairly adequate provision ". In this country no one would agree to anything less than twice that number as beginning to touch the problem. The author has written a very readable book in spite of the enormous amount of statistical and financial material included. It reveals a problem which is probably typical of all the problems America has now to face. On the one hand there are great modern hospitals built, equipped and staffed on the grandest American fashion and, on the other hand, there are areas with no hospital provisions and others with only the most meagre resources. As much as any study of the total economic system of America this examination of one part of the social services reveals the inability of capitalism to tackle the major problems of civilisation.

D. S. M.

PLANNING OF RURAL SCHOOLS FOR CHILDREN UNDER SEVEN Nursery Schools Association of Great Britain (U L P 2/6)

" Country children get a raw deal ", the writer quotes from a country teacher. So do children too often in our towns. The book is a useful survey of the essential features of school building required for children between the ages of two and seven.

B. D.

EDUCATION IN NORWAY By Nils Hjelm Tvelt (Hodder 5/–)

Organised teaching in Norway, the writer tells us, began about the year 1150. The schools were attached to Episcopal Sees, with the aim " to educate for the serving of the Church, the King and the Country ", or the feudal equivalent of education for citizenship. School attendance was made compulsory for *all* as early as 1739, but not generally enforced until a century later. The people's school today accounts for 95.5 per cent of children liable to attendance. The average leaving age is 14, but about 60 per cent of pupils proceed at this stage to secondary schools. These belong to two types: (1) the *gymnaseum* (45 per

cent) which offers a five-year course leading to a university; (2) the *realskole* (13 per cent) offering a three-year course with a more practical bias. But both types of school provide a common core of subjects in the first two years, so that pupils may transfer readily from one school to the other. Other pupils proceed at 14 to Trade schools. Local authorities further have power to enforce the attendance of older children at day continuation courses, and the compulsory leaving age in many areas is in effect 15. Under the so-called " Unity System " all schools from the nursery school to the university have been brought within an interdependent and coherent plan. The book deserves careful study of all those interested in development plans at home.

B. D.

CAREERS AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING—*A Complete Guide to Women's Professions* (Women's Employment Publishing Co. Ltd. 1946 10/6)

This is the 11th edition of a book whose title is self-explanatory. Details are given regarding some 176 ways educated girls and women may wish to earn their living—from accountancy to zoology, alphabetically. Advice includes the prospects in each type of employment, the training necessary, where it can be obtained, its cost, the general qualities required to be successful. Also frank statements as to lack of prospects. An invaluable reference book for all concerned with young women deciding upon their careers.

D. W.

OLD PEOPLE—Report of a Survey Committee appointed by the Nuffield Foundation under the chairmanship of B. Seebohm Rowntree (O U P 3/6)

This excellent piece of work has received a good deal of publicity in the Press, which, however, has mainly concerned itself with the scandalous conditions, described on page 69, under which some private " homes for the aged " are run. This is a pity, because these scandals, regrettable as they are, are only a small part of the problem of the old, which has itself changed largely in character over the last generation. With the shifting age-balance of the population, we are faced with two important necessities—first, to provide in conditions acceptable to the humanitarianism of the present age, for an increasing proportion of people who have passed " working age ", and secondly, to see that all these people do not simply become a burden on their younger fellow-citizens, and that the working ability of those who have passed " working age " is utilised. In this connection. Chapter 6 of this book, " The Old in Employment ", deserves very careful study, with its conclusions that the elderly workers, if suitably employed, in the vast majority of cases earned no less than the younger ones, and that it was not necessary to fix special piece-rates for them. (It should be remembered, however, that these elderly workers were, to some extent, a picked lot and trained in an earlier tradition; it does not necessarily follow that the workers of today in a high-pressure plant may be as adaptable when over sixty-five).

The second question, that of caring for the aged who are no longer capable of working in any economic sense, is obviously of first importance, and needs, as the Survey suggests, a good deal of special social research. We have passed well beyond the days when a crudely economic society tested the old *person's* right to survive by putting him up a tree and endeavouring to shake him down, though the Report gives a melancholy history of the necessary sufferings of the aged poor even up to 1940, when the supplementary pensions were introduced. (It is almost incredible to remember that so great a philanthropist as Charles Booth fought hard against *any* non-contributory pension.)

We now give some money to the old. But the problem of their care and happiness, as everyone knows, is not by any means merely one of money ; it is one of housing, of medical care and, above all, of friendly treatment by the community, which in its turn pre-supposes a good deal of research and experimentation which has not yet been done. The Report is right in drawing attention to this and sound in many of its suggestions, including the small one that the absurd and often offensive charities surviving from Victorian days should be rationalised. It is well worth buying and reading.

M. I. C.

THE COLONIAL OFFICE FROM WITHIN By Sir Cosmo Parkinson (Faber 1947 8/6)

Sir Cosmo, permanent head of the Colonial Office from 1937 and during the war years, and with a lifetime of work in the one government department, has deftly sketched the work of his colleagues and the growth of the activities of the Office. The best of the book is in its shy humanity, its humorous asides, its sly digs at anonymous characters, its eloquent silences. There is a theme which would repay more serious study both for this department and others, suggested in the comparison of the form of the machine in 1907 and in 1947, changed principally in response to demands for colonial welfare and development planning. But to explore this was not Sir Cosmo's purpose. He wrote for his Colonial Office friends. They too, however, must regret that the "distribution of work-list" in the middle dulls somewhat the sparkle of the opening and concluding chapters. Credit is due to the publishers for this specialised venture in a season of paper shortage, for none of us would expect it to have a public wider than the few in the Office itself, in the administrative staff of the Colonial Service and of other departments, and students of government outside.

D. M. S.

THE FUTURE OF THE COAL MINER (H M S O 9d)

Here is an ideal guide to those who want to join the coal industry or want to understand the problem confronting the industry now and in the future. It is well illustrated and in simple non-technical language puts the case forcibly for greater mechanisation and progressive ideas on training. To be commended to all who are or are not conscious of our economic dependence on this basic industry.

R. D.